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This article seeks to situate the increasing salience of social cohesion in the context of 
the transition from apartheid to a post-apartheid society. It starts by analysing the 
changing political and economic landscape post 1990. It pays particular attention to the 
role of Nelson Mandela as a symbol of national unity; this despite the fact that the 
African National Congress (ANC) government’s economic policies failed to have a 
fundamental impact on levels of poverty and inequality. But with the end of Mandela’s 
presidency and the inability of his successor Thabo Mbeki’s policies to also make a dent 
on inequality and poverty, what we have seen are rising levels of community and labour 
unrest. In this context, the article argues that notions like social cohesion and ubuntu 
have assumed increasing importance as ways to stitch together a fracturing society. 
The latter part of the article argues that, with high levels of poverty and inequality, 
commodification of basic services and mounting social protests, it is difficult to deploy 
ideas like social cohesion, especially when new political subjectivities are challenging 
the hegemony of the ANC.    
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New beginnings 
In 1990, the liberation movements in South Africa were unbanned and Nelson Mandela 
strode out of prison. In one bold stroke, the country’s political landscape changed. The 
African National Congress (ANC) led negotiations with the apartheid regime and within 
four years, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically elected 
President of South Africa. The declared goals of progressive organisations and 
individuals in the immediate years after the unbanning of the ANC were the building of 
non-racialism and overcoming apartheid’s legacy. Mandela’s release and subsequent 
endorsement of the Freedom Charter encouraged expectations of speedy and 
fundamental changes in South Africa’s political economy. But soon, the ANC 
leadership, sobered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, made a series of concessions 
that essentially left the commanding heights of the economy intact (Marais, 2011).  
 
Words like pragmatism and the practical realities of managing the economy quickly 
replaced the high-sounding promises of the Freedom Charter. Transformation, it was 
held, had to occur with due regard for white fears of being swamped and the attendant 
capital flight and skills deficit which those taking over the reins of power would have to 
confront.  
 
Alongside this, the ANC government-in-waiting was keen on the demobilisation of a 
range of strident mass movements, which they held espoused radical but 
‘unsustainable’ visions of social change. The emphasis was on stability and creating the 
necessary conditions for a negotiated settlement (Alexander, 2002).  
 
At a general level, demobilisation was accompanied by attempts at de-politicisation and 
change as a set of technical issues and targets to be met. Conflict, as Harold Wolpe 
pointed out, was to be kept to a bare minimum, with debates around the nature of 
transformation and the imperative of restructuring “immediately offset by dissolving the 
differences into the goals” (1995: 97). 
 
The ANC was keen to suture the local economy into the rhythms of global capitalism. In 
their analysis, this swift normalising of relations would pave the way for foreign 
investment, fuelling economic growth and acting as the bridgehead for deeper societal 
transformation through a myriad of reconstruction and development programmes (Saul 
and Bond, 2014). 
 
A country that witnessed sustained mobilisation throughout the 1980s began to see 
significant changes. The ANC absorbed the Mass Democratic Movement; the union 
movement accepted the leadership of the ANC in the hope that an alliance would 
secure major legislative concessions; many civic organisations, when not acting as 
voting banks for councillors, doubled as ANC branches. Stability was the watchword 
everywhere.  
 
In thinking through the transition, we need to keep in mind two broad approaches that 
can broadly be labelled ‘reformative’ and ‘transformative’.1 The transformative project 
sought to fundamentally transform the way in which society was structured; its 
economic emphasis was captured in the popular slogan ‘growth through redistribution’, 
a bottom-up, mass based approach. The reformative approach, on the other hand, 
prioritised reconciliation and cooperative governance in the interests of economic 
growth and acceptance into a neoliberal world order. In this scenario, conditions suited 
to facilitate an environment for doing business in South Africa would be created. The 
logic underlying this paradigm was that the benefits of economic growth would 
‘naturally’ trickle down to the poorest members of society, encapsulated in the adage 
‘redistribution through growth’. State intervention would help to de-racialise the 
uppermost reaches of the class hierarchy through the pursuit of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE).  
 
                                                          
1 For a fuller exposition of these ideas, see Desai, A (ed) (2010) The race to transform: Sports in post-
apartheid South Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Press.  
 
It was the reformative project that won hegemony as the transition to democracy 
unfolded; its’ “twin objectives of restoring business confidence and attracting foreign 
investment seemed to swamp all other considerations” (Murray, 1994: 24). However, 
this didn’t mean that attempts were not made to integrate the reformative and 
transformative approaches, encapsulated in the ‘two economies’ thesis. In 2003, 
President Thabo Mbeki characterised South African society as divided between first and 
third world components. For Mbeki, the ‘first world economy’ was “structurally 
disconnected” from the ‘third world economy’. Mbeki argued that the solution lay in the 
tweaking of the neoliberal approach so that government intervention could support “the 
development of the ‘third world economy’ to the point that it loses its ‘third world’ 
character and becomes part of the ‘first world economy’” (Mbeki, 2003).  
 
The ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was hollowed out and 
replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) plan, announced in 
1996. At the core of GEAR was the fostering of conditions for the accumulation and 
profitability of capital. The state, it was argued, would redress apartheid’s legacy 
through taxes geared towards reconstruction and development and the extension of 
grants. In addition, the entry of new Black entrepreneurs through economic 
empowerment imperatives would progressively de-racialise the upper echelons of the 
economy. And a small black elite did start to emerge, as well as a growing Black middle 
class. While this was celebrated as an indication of gains made in the first decade of the 
transition, at the same time, it served to heighten the fact that the poorest of the poor 
hardly saw an advance in their economic condition.  
 The transition to democracy and the economic programmes that unfolded failed to make 
an impact on levels of poverty and inequality. As former Robben Island prisoner Neville 
Alexander put it in 2002: “The stark reality is that the political settlement of 1993-94 was 
based...on the assumption of a more or less rapid trickle-down effect deriving from the 
‘miraculous’ increase in the rate of the GDP...The real situation is that hardly any 
change has taken place in the relations of economic power and control. Moreover, in 
the foreseeable future and in terms of the prevailing system, no such fundamental 
change is to be expected. With hardly any exceptions, the sources of economic power 
remain in hands that controlled them under apartheid” (2002: 144-46).  
 
While a small, super rich black elite and a black middle class centred mainly in the civil 
service and the lucrative world of tenderpreneurship emerged, the years post 1994 saw 
unemployment increase and inequality deepen (Marais, 2011). The state of South 
Africa’s economy was outlined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
in unusually blunt language: “...highly skewed distribution of wealth; an extremely large 
earnings inequality; weak access to basic services by the poor, unemployed and 
underemployed; a declining employment outcome of economic growth; environmental 
degradation; HIV/AIDS, and an inadequate social security system” (2003: 90).  
 
 
While the transition can be narrated in hard economic terms, there was also the factor 
of Madiba (Mandela). It was a powerful time of hope in South Africa.  
 
Madiba magic  
With Mandela at the helm, it was a time of embracing, of grand gestures, of style and 
the possibility of everyday freedom, whatever the structural and historical constraints. 
Mandela for example, saw sport as a powerful weapon, to not only heal racial divisions, 
but also to smooth the way for South Africa’s entry into the comity of nations. So even 
while negotiations were on-going and the apartheid National Party held power, Mandela 
sanctioned South Africa’s participation in the Cricket World Cup and the 1992 Olympics. 
The 1995 victory at the Rugby World Cup, with Mandela resplendent in a Springbok 
jersey, was received with global acclaim. This was followed by the winning of soccer’s 
African Cup of Nations.  
 
It was at this time that the idea of Madiba Magic caught the public imagination and a 
belief that something exceptional was being born in South Africa (Lodge, 2003). 
Mandela was seen as the “magnanimous sorcerer” and his actions and statements 
“acquired a providential hue” (Cabrujas in Coronil, 1997: 1). There was a deep sense 
that Madiba Magic would conjure an audacious spell, propelling the country into the 
global economy while ensuring local levels of upliftment and redistribution.  
 
 It signalled a time when those who suffered under the yoke of apartheid would take their 
place as fully-fledged citizens under a new flag and national anthem, guided by a new 
constitution in a new South Africa. Mandela marked the closure of one long terrible 
worldwide history, defined by colonial dispossession and racial oppression. At the same 
time, he signalled an opening; of a time when all South Africans would be free from 
racial and economic exclusions, blessed to be living under the benevolent gaze of the 
“Rainbow Nation of God.”2 
 
The coming to power of Thabo Mbeki saw a renewed commitment to advancing the 
transformation agenda through a series of policy interventions. But they failed to make a 
dent in the levels of inequality and poverty. And when Mbeki gave way to Jacob Zuma, 
expectations were fuelled of a radical change in policy that would drive a redistribution 
programme. These expectations were once more sacrificed on the altar of economic 
‘realities’.  
 
On the ground, there were increasing levels of violent protest. Fractures in the ruling 
party, as cadres jostled for position and tensions within the Alliance and the expulsion of 
the powerful National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) from COSATU, only served to 
                                                          
2 The phrase “rainbow nation” was first used by Archbishop Desmond Tutu in 1994 in a series of televised 
appearances. 
highlight the fact that any ideas of blossoming nationhood were faltering (Satgar and 
Southall, 2015). It seemed light years away from the glow of the Mandela years.  
 
In this context of fragmentation and division, the government has emphasised the 
importance of a socially cohesive society. In the next section, we look at this idea and 
try to discern what is meant by social cohesion.  
 
Social cohesion – a magic balm? 
In the face of mounting divisions and fault-lines in South African society, the 
government, supported by civil society and the private sector, has placed great faith in 
the idea of social cohesion. National and provincial summits are convened to explore 
the topic. In almost every national and provincial policy document, the phrase ‘social 
cohesion’ is reiterated and emphasised. It is as if some new magic balm has been 
invented that will be able to glue Alexandra with Sandton, Cecil John Rhodes with 
Nelson Mandela, Mohandas Gandhi with Eugene de Kock, Cyril Ramaphosa with the 34 
murdered miners at Marikana, the Catholic Archbishop with the Gay and Lesbian lobby. 
 
So what exactly is social cohesion? One gets definitions like this from the Department of 
Arts and Culture: “The degree of social integration and inclusion in communities and 
society at large, and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression itself among 
individuals and communities. In terms of this definition, a community or society is 
cohesive to the extent that the inequalities, exclusions and disparities based on 
ethnicity, gender, class, nationality, age, disability or any other distinctions which 
engender divisions distrust and conflict are reduced and/or eliminated in a planned and 
sustained manner” (DAC, 2012).  
 
This definition lends itself to more questions than answers. What constitutes a 
community? Who decides on the plan to reduce inequality? What if the state’s plans 
exacerbate inequality? When is discrimination deemed to be positive or negative? For 
example, affirmative action focuses on race and reinforces race thinking, yet at the 
same time, it is a tool to redress past discrimination.   
 
According to Cloete and Kotze (2009: 7), and based on Jensen’s 1998 study, social 
cohesion consists of five dimensions: 
• Belonging: To be part of and to experience a sense of affiliation to the 
community and the larger society. It involves processes of identification and 
acceptance within a community and larger society. In a diverse society such as 
South Africa, it requires identification with and acceptance of groups. 
• Inclusion: To be included on an equal basis in all social activities and rights 
and to have equal access to all life opportunities. 
• Participation: This, unhindered, means active involvement in community and 
social activities, programmes and events. 
• Recognition: To recognise, acknowledge and value differences without 
discrimination. 
• Legitimacy: Refers to the integrity and social legitimacy of public bodies and 
leaders representing community members and citizens. 
 
Again, each one of these dimensions is open to interpretation. “To be included on an 
equal basis” demands an equal playing field. And if that doesn’t exist, how does one 
decide what should be done to compensate? For example, in a cricket team, should a 
quota system make place for three players of colour or four? And can one really avoid 
policies like quotas that undoubtedly create tensions and divisions?  
 
Demanding equality for township spaza shop-owners squeezed out by competition from 
Somali entrepreneurs , South African Minister for Small Business Development, Lindiwe 
Zulu, demanded that Somalis share their trade secrets with locals to ensure they are 
accepted in the communities (Business Day, 28 January 2015). Suddenly the foreign 
shopkeepers were turned into a sect akin to witches, who if they did not reveal their 
magic formula, would be sent on their way. It is a far cry from the four key pillars of 
“diversity, inclusiveness, access and values” espoused at a Social Cohesion summit 
held in 2012. The Department of Arts and Culture holds that social cohesion is based on 
the following principles: 
• Constitutional Democracy 
• Human Rights and Equality 
• Non‐racialism, Non‐tribalism and Non‐sexism 
• Unity in Diversity 
• Inclusivity and Social Justice 
• Redress and Transformation 
• Intergroup and Community Co‐operation 
• Social Solidarity 
• Active and Participatory Citizenship 
• Civic Responsibility 
• National Consciousness 
 
These principles are replete with contradictory impulses. To develop a national 
consciousness is to create boundaries with ‘outsiders’. To pursue race-based redress 
that uses apartheid categories is to work against non-racialism. What will constitute civic 
responsibility or active citizenship? Is taking part in protests a form of active citizenship 
or is it to be reduced to waving the national flag? 
 
And social solidarity with whom? A spontaneous march of middle class suburbanites 
took place in April in Port Elizabeth after the tragic abduction and killing of a beloved 
school teacher. They demanded an end to savagery and called for the death penalty. In 
their minds, against which spectre were they truly marching? The question is relevant 
because social mobilisation dimmed considerably when the white husband was arrested 
(Times Live, 3 May 2015). 
 
At the government’s Social Cohesion Summit held in March 2015, Minister Nathi 
Mthethwa said that “Social cohesion will only succeed through all round and 
interconnected efforts for social progress which will change material conditions of the 
populace for the better. It means the total transfer of political and economic power to the 
democratic majority” (Social Cohesion Summit, Port Elizabeth, 30 March 2015). What 
does Minister Mthethwa, the Minister of Police at the time of the Marikana massacre 
mean by “total transfer”? After all, his Party is dedicated to private ownership of the 
means of production. What does a “democratic majority” mean? Those who vote or ally 
themselves with minority parties will be left out of the redistribution dividend? In thinking 
through the many meanings of social cohesion, one is reminded of Clifford Geertz’s 
phrase, “The stultifying aura of conceptual ambiguity” (1973: 257). 
 




Thabo Mbeki was one of the first leaders to bring together the idea of social cohesion 
and ubuntu: “a person is a person through other persons”, emphasising co-operation 
rather than conflict and encouraging mutual understanding and tolerance, holding that 
“Our society has been captured by a rapacious individualism which is corroding our 
social cohesion, which is repudiating the value and practice of human solidarity, and 
which totally rejects the fundamental precept of Ubuntu” (Mbeki, 2007: 16). Some would 
argue that the railing against rapacious individualism was a bit rich coming from Mbeki, 
given that he was keen to develop a black bourgeoisie and whose economic policies 
were fingered for exacerbating inequality and poverty.  
 
But to mitigate poverty and inequality, there is always ubuntu. Ubuntu is given a deep 
history dating back to pre-colonial times according to the Department of Arts and 
Culture: “In the context of South Africa, it may be said that a concern with social 
cohesion dates even further back to the advent of colonialism and its disruptive and 
destructive effects of dispossession and exclusion on local communities and society at 
large, as well as the social upheavals this system spawned. The issue of social 
cohesion was pertinent throughout the 20th century in the wake of urbanisation and 
forced removals. Modern nation‐building, on the other hand, dates back to the struggles 
for national liberation in the 19th century which saw a spirit of nationalism inspired by 
struggles for independence across the globe. So, just as the disintegration of local 
communities dates back to the violent contact of local communities with advancing 
colonists, the South African struggle for national liberation and national unity is not 
something new or recent”  (2012: 30). 
 So, what we have is a pristine, placid society that becomes corrupted with the advent of 
colonialism. However, as Christoph Marx points out, it is important to discern how 
ubuntu can be deployed in present day South Africa: “Chiefs are able to treat Ubuntu 
and nation building as a tradition-oriented project, and to resume seamlessly the 
legitimation patterns of apartheid… the other side of communalism is unfolding 
gradually: a suppression of individual freedom, pressure to behave in a conformist 
manner, convulsive conservatism, and the exclusion of both inner-party and external 
critics. The message is clear: whoever resists the power of the Chiefs is a traitor to his 
own culture, i.e. to the nation. ‘Tradition’ and ‘culture’ have even been used to legitimise 
discrimination and (rapidly increasing) violence against women” (2002: 63).  
 
Ubuntu, by emphasising some ideal pre-colonial past and the use of ethno-cultural 
inflections only serves to reinforce the power of chiefs, cuts off critical thinking and could 
be used to discriminate and exclude rather than develop social cohesion.  
 
Using the example of the lauding of home/community based care by the state in the 
case of HIV/AIDS patients, Hein Marais (2005) shows how neo-liberalism (with its 
demand for less and less state support in public health and emphasis on privatisation) 
and ubuntu fit snugly with each other. “To pretend that home- and community-based 
care express a reanimated social solidarity that can supplant the logic and the ethics of 
the market is to miss the plot entirely. While the well-being of the poor becomes ever 
more precarious, additional burdens are being shifted onto them. Celebrating this as an 
expression of hardiness and vim, an affirmation of ubuntu, seems morally base. In 
practice, home-and community-based care displaces much of the burden of care into 
the ‘invisible’ zones of the home and the neighbourhood – and specifically onto women, 
most of them poor, many of them desperately so” (Marais, 2005: 67).  
 
Capitalism not only hurries in new production relations but also new commodities. 
Mandela, in the first visit to his village in Qunu after release from three decades in 
prison, writes hauntingly of how the arrival of commodities had affected the environment 
and social relations of the area: “When I was young, the village was tidy, the water pure, 
and the grass green and unsullied as far as the eye could see. Kraals were swept, 
topsoil was conserved, fields were neatly divided. But now the village was unswept, the 
water polluted, and the countryside littered with plastic bags and wrappers. We had not 
known of plastic when I was a boy, and though it surely improved life in some ways, its 
presence in Qunu appeared to me to be a kind of blight. Pride in the community seemed 
to have vanished” (Mandela, 1994: 581). Imagine what two decades of Mandela 
capitalism has unleashed on the countryside?  
 
In the context of the deepening of capitalist relations and commodification of basic 
services, ubuntu is seen as the way to ensure social cohesion.  
 
It is raised at every possible opportunity In the aftermath of the xenophobic attacks of 
2015, Amanda Gcabashe entered the debate with an article in Business Day (17 April 
2015) entitled “We need to revive the principles of Ubuntu”. For her, the way to 
counteract xenophobia was to return to the “forgotten principles of ubuntu-a pointer to 
the value of human life in African culture.” 
 
According to Gcabashe, there have been no attacks on “‘foreign’ businesses...under 
tribal authority.” This is because “registration is carried out the traditional way-by the 
community according to norms they agreed to...not by councillors and administrators 
who do not understand the community dynamics.” 
 
Gcabashe then goes on to explain how her family recently acquired land outside 
Pietermaritzburg. “Before the transaction was finalised, we had to have a referral letter 
from someone attesting to our character. After the chief accepted this letter, the 
headman of the chief had to introduce us to the community around us at a formal 
ceremony. It is only after these processes had been completed that we could proceed 
and assume ownership of the land we bought. We did not parachute in from out of town 
nor were we assigned land in a secret deal between ourselves and the seller. Contrast 
this with the allocation of RDP houses, which is done out of sight of the community. 
How many times have we heard of community protests because houses are allocated to 
‘outsiders’?” 
 
By following precepts that hark back to pre-colonial times, we can “build social cohesion 
and prosperity”, according to Gcabashe. In Gcabashe’s worldview, the way to deal with 
xenophobia is to give the headman and communities the authority to decide who fits in 
and who does not, who is an outsider and who deserves to be allocated houses. One is 
reminded of Belinda du Plooy’s warning that ubuntu can “lead to oppressive, stifling 
conformity...tribalistic exclusion, hierarchical patriarchal relations...” (2014: 92).  
 
With government targets missing the mark, its own legitimacy under attack and people 
eschewing institutions for the streets, one can see why the ANC is keen on social 
cohesion. It allows for social cohesion to function as a means of cutting off dissent and 
imposing conformity.   
 
Between cohesion and capitalism  
Social cohesion is better than social conflict, it could be argued. But this is to elide the 
daily violence of the poor that ensures life is “nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes, 1960: 
82). The rich develop social cohesion through Chambers of Commerce and gated 
communities. They work out the rules of engagement and settle their differences 
through expensive litigation. The poor take to the streets to demand delivery. Workers 
go on strike to demand a living wage. Within a liberal democracy, it is these recalcitrant, 
noisy, impatient, some would even argue ungrateful citizens whom the ruling classes 
believe need a healthy dose of social cohesion.  
 
In thinking through words like social cohesion and the resurrection of ubuntu in the 
context of the ANC’s deepening capitalism, even shooting mine-workers to ensure 
maximum profit, as was suggested in the Farlam Commission, one is reminded of 
Orwell’s definition of doublespeak: “In our time, political speech and writing are largely 
the defence of the indefensible… Thus political language has to consist largely of 
euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness… The great enemy of clear 
language is insincerity. Where there is a gap between one’s real and one’s declared 
aims, one turns as it were instinctively to... exhausted idioms ...”  (Orwell, 1969: 153-
154). 
 
Social cohesion demands that no matter what the provocations of the state, we must 
look for ways to come together and believe in their sincerity. This is problematic in many 
ways. Not least of which, as Gregersen points out, is that in liberal democracies, social 
cohesion demands coercion and “cohesion policies seem inappropriate for dealing with 
all political issues, such as the underlying distribution of power and recognition that 
determine the social distribution of goods and rights” (Gregersen, 2013: 88). 
 
Social cohesion is a tool in which the state wants to condition us so that we begin to act 
not as critical subjects but in a Pavlovian way. They seek to achieve this not by 
authoritarianism but through the inculcation of a belief that dissent and protest are 
against the national interest. As Gregersen points out: “The meaning of ‘SC’ 
approximates ‘good society’ in the political discourse. Justifications for cohesion policies 
thus resemble tautologies: One should promote a good society because it is good. 
Correspondingly, policies contrary to SC are predefined as bad” (Gregersen, 2013: 88). 
In South Africa, this means that proponents of social cohesion seek to manage 
antagonism at precisely the point when we need robust political engagement, political 
analysis and political action. One is reminded of Foucault’s idea of governmentality as 
seeking to determine “the conduct of conduct” (in Brown, 2006: 5). Social cohesion 
seeks to depoliticise, which as Brown points out: “involves removing a political 
phenomenon from comprehension of its historical emergence and from a recognition of 
the powers that produce and contour it. No matter its particular form and mechanics, 
depoliticization always eschews power and history in the representation of its subject” 
(2006: 15). 
 
Despite attempts to deploy ideas like social cohesion to draw people into supporting 
programmes such as the National Development Plan, insurgent protests spanning both 
community and labour keep bubbling (Brown, 2015).  
 
Challenge from below 
The last three years in South Africa have seen unprecedented countrywide protests 
ranging from lack of service delivery to university education fees. Alongside this, the 
model of creating a Black elite and the hopes that this burgeoning wealth will trickle 
downwards have come under sustained attack.  
 
During the Mandela and Mbeki years, and despite reports of rising inequality, there was 
a sense that the fruits of liberation were slowly ripening and would soon fall to those 
most in need. Recently however, there has been a questioning of the thesis that 
democracy will encourage the market to progressively level the playing fields. Protests 
over the lack of basic services have escalated and turned more violent. The state has 
responded with apartheid-style repression, most dramatically shooting dead 34 striking 
miners at Marikana.   
 
In the interim, a new political party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) has 
emerged, proclaiming a radical economic policy, and garnering some one million votes 
in the 2014 national elections. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUMSA), forced out 
of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), is seeking to sponsor a 
United Front, demanding an end to what it labels the ANC’s anti-poor economic policies. 
As Achille Mbembe has put it: “Rainbowism and its most important articles of faith-truth, 
reconciliation and forgiveness-is fading. Reduced to a totemic commodity figure mostly 
destined to assuage whites’ fears, Nelson Mandela is on trial. Some of the key pillars of 
the 1994 dispensation-a constitutional democracy, a market society, non-racialism-are 
also under scrutiny. They are now perceived as disabling devices with no animating 
potency, at least in the eyes of those who are determined to no longer wait. We are past 
the time of promises. Now is the time to settle accounts” (2015).  
 
Meanwhile, South Africa hurtles towards the general election of 2019. The ANC faces 
changes to its leadership with a new President to be elected in 2018. With factionalism 
and regionalism on the rise, boardroom deal-making abounds. The Democratic Alliance, 
with a new Black leader, strains against its image as defender of white privilege while 
making ground in the townships, once ANC strongholds. On the left, the EFF has 
overtaken the South African Communist Party as embodiment of the hope that there will 
be a second stage to the South African revolution, one where peasant and proletarian 
ascend.  
 
Perhaps we are at the point that William Gumede writes about? “South Africa is entering 
the 20-year post-liberation mark when many African liberation governments turned 
governments, who fail to deliver adequately on promises, either break-up, splinter or 
fragment when members and supporters leave it for new parties. The tipping point has 
been reached where the gap between the ANC leadership and the daily grind of 
ordinary members may have now become such a wide gulf that many ANC members 
who may have deep affinity with the party may now not be able anymore to identify 
themselves with both the leaders and the party” (2013). 
 
With these issues in mind, will the ANC be able to re-invent itself in a way that 
recaptures the ground it has lost to the left? Signs already abound. In the July 2015 
‘lekgotla’3 of the ANC’s national executive committee, general secretary Gwede 
                                                          
3 Sotho and Tswana word for conference or business meeting. 
Mantashe made the point “that high unemployment, deepening poverty and growing 
inequality pose a real threat in the long term”, as he questioned policies that allowed 
South African companies to list on the London Stock Exchange, throwing into sharp 
relief the ANC’s Faustian pact with global finance and local capital (The Star, 7 August 
2015). 
 
Will the present government rely on a combination of building a Black middle class 
alongside a repressive apparatus to keep discontent in check, while ratcheting up the 
rhetoric on issues like the composition of national sports teams and playing to the 
ascendancy of racial nationalism?  
 
We live at a time when representations of the liberation struggle which produced unity 
are crumbling. Durkheim’s words are presicient: “the former gods are growing old or 
dying, and others have not been born” (1995: 429).  
 
In this period of uncertainty and fracture, and in the absence of a fundamental shift in 
economic policy towards redistribution, attempts to keep things together with ideas like 
social cohesion will be increasingly hard to sustain.  
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